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We introduce a symmetrization technique which can be used as an extra step in some continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocols. By randomizing the data in phase space, one can
dramatically simplify the security analysis of the protocols, in particular in the case of collective
attacks. The main application of this procedure concerns protocols with postselection, for which
security was established only against Gaussian attacks until now. Here, we prove that under some
experimentally verifiable conditions, Gaussian attacks are optimal among all collective attacks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art of distill-
ing a secret key among distant parties, Alice and Bob,
in an untrusted environment. The remarkable feature of
QKD is that it is secure in an information theoretic sense
[1]. QKD protocols come in two flavors depending on the
type of quantum measurement they use: either a photon
counting measurement for discrete-variable protocols or a
homodyne detection for continuous-variable (CV) QKD.
While the security of the former is now rather well un-
derstood (with the notable exceptions of the differential
phase shift [2] and coherent one-way [3] protocols), secu-
rity of CV protocols has been more elusive (see [4] for a
recent review). This is mainly due to the fact that the
infinite dimensional Hilbert space required to describe
these protocols makes the analysis quite challenging.
Among all CVQKD schemes, the protocol GG02 is cer-
tainly the easiest one to analyze [5]. In this protocol, Al-
ice sends n coherent states |αk〉 = |x2k + ix2k+1〉 to Bob
who measures the states he receives either with a homo-
dyne detection (thus randomly choosing one quadrature
to measure for each state) or a heterodyne detection (in
which case, Bob measures both quadratures at the same
time). Alice’s modulation is Gaussian, meaning that xk is
a centered normal random variable with a given variance.
In the case of a heterodyne detection for instance [6], Bob
obtains a classical vector y = [y1, · · · , y2n] which is cor-
related to Alice’s vector x = [x1, · · · , x2n]. In this paper,
we use bold font to refer to vectors. Then, using param-
eter estimation, reconciliation and privacy amplification,
they can extract a secret key. For this specific protocol,
Gaussian attacks (where the action of the eavesdropper
can be modeled by a Gaussian quantum channel between
Alice and Bob) are known to be optimal among collective
attacks [7–9]. Using de Finetti theorem and conditioned
upon an extra verification step [10], these collective at-
tacks are actually optimal in general in the asymptotic
limit. The only step which is currently missing in this
security analysis is a tight reduction from coherent to
collective attacks in the finite-size regime [11].
The security status of other CVQKD protocols is far
less advanced. In particular, not much is known for pro-
tocols using postselection [12–14]. In these protocols, the
idea is that Alice and Bob will only use some data to
distill the secret key and discard the rest. More pre-
cisely, they only keep the data compatible with a posi-
tive key rate. This method, inspired by advantage distil-
lation techniques, certainly makes the protocol more ro-
bust against imperfections such as losses or noise in the
channel, and potentially gives the best practical CVQKD
protocol (see Refs. [14, 15] for experimental implemen-
tations). It is therefore of considerable importance to
be able to assess its security. Unfortunately, there are
currently no full security proof for this scheme, not even
against collective attacks. In fact, the only result avail-
able so far is an analysis in the case of Gaussian attacks
[16, 17]. This is, however, far from being sufficient for two
reasons: first, Gaussian attacks are not believed to be op-
timal against this protocol; second, one can never prove
in practice that a given quantum channel is indeed Gaus-
sian. The problem is that the only tool currently avail-
able to establish the security of a CV protocol against
collective attacks, namely Gaussian optimality [18] does
not seem to help much for protocols with postselection
(see, however, a recent approach along those lines in Ref.
[19]).
In this paper, we introduce a new proof technique
based on a symmetrization procedure that allows us to
make some progress concerning the security analysis of
CVQKD with postselection. In particular, we will show
how this symmetrization allows us, under some verifiable
conditions, to consider that the quantum channel is in-
deed Gaussian, even though the physical channel may
actually be non-Gaussian. This then means that check-
ing the security against Gaussian attacks (which can be
done with present tools) is indeed sufficient to get full
security against collective attacks, and in fact against
arbitrary attacks in the asymptotic limit thanks to de
Finetti theorem [10].
I. A SYMMETRIZED PROTOCOL
The usual technique to prove the security of a Pre-
pare and Measure (PM) protocol such as GG02 where
Alice sends coherent states to Bob who measures them, is
to consider an equivalent Entanglement-Based (EB) pro-
tocol. In the latter, Alice prepares two-mode squeezed
vacuum states of which she measures one mode with a
heterodyne detection and sends the second mode to Bob.
Interestingly, before Alice and Bob measure their respec-
tive modes, their share a bipartite state ρAB. In this
2paper, we will restrict our attention to collective attacks,
meaning that at the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob
share n copies of that state, that is, ρ⊗nAB.
In general, one cannot perform a perfect tomography
of this state, simply because it lives in an infinite dimen-
sional Hilbert space. In the case of protocols without
postselection, this is not a problem since the secret key
rate can be safely computed from the the Gaussian state
with the same first two moments as ρAB [7, 8]. This is
remarkable because one only needs to compute the co-
variance matrix of the state instead of its whole density
matrix.
Unfortunately, this approach fails in the case of pro-
tocols with postselection. Indeed, one would then need
to compute the covariance matrix of the state given it
was postselected. In principle, one could do this analysis
with the experimental data obtained from the EB version
of the protocol; but one cannot directly reconstruct this
covariance matrix from the data observed in the actual
PM version of the protocol. Indeed, the probabilistic
map corresponding to a successful postselection is too
complicated and one cannot expect to analyze its effect
on general non-Gaussian states. For this reason, our only
hope for a security proof seems to be to somehow enforce
the Gaussianity of the state ρAB Alice and Bob will use
in their protocol. The idea is therefore to add an extra
step to the usual protocol, that will make the state ρ⊗nAB
more Gaussian. Let us note S the quantum map induced
by this symmetrization.
It is now clear that if one had S (ρ⊗nAB) = ρ⊗nG where ρG
is the bipartite Gaussian state with the same covariance
matrix as ρAB, then the security of the symmetrized pro-
tocol against general collective attacks would be identi-
cal to the security of the original protocol against Gaus-
sian attacks. One could then compute the secret key
rate, simply from the transmission and excess noise of
the quantum channel, exactly as in the case of protocols
without postselection. The symmetrization we introduce
below will not induce an exact Gaussification, but only
an approximate one. However, the quality of the Gaus-
sification, characterized by the fidelity between S (ρ⊗nAB)
and ρ⊗nG will increase with n, and tend to 1 if some exper-
imentally verifiable conditions (on the moment of order
4 of ρAB) are met.
The symmetrization we consider here was introduced
in [20] where it was argued that it corresponds to the
natural symmetry for protocols using a Gaussian mod-
ulation of coherent states. In the EB scenario, before
they both perform their heterodyne measurements, Al-
ice and Bob would apply random conjugate passive lin-
ear transformations over their n modes. Once this is
done, they apply the usual postselection protocol. This
symmetrization can also be used in the PM scenario,
and crucially, one can simply apply it to the classical
data x and y of Alice and Bob. More concretely, in
the PM scenario, Alice and Bob follow the standard sce-
nario of sending coherent states and performing a het-
erodyne detection for Bob. Then, Alice draws a ran-
dom transformation with the Haar measure on the group
K(n) := O(2n,R)∩Sp(2n,R) (isomorphic to the unitary
group U(n)), that is the transformations corresponding
to linear passive transformations in phase-space. She in-
forms Bob of her choice of transformation (over the au-
thenticated classical channel), and both parties apply this
transformation to their respective 2n-vectors x and y.
II. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE EB AND
PM SYMMETRIZED PROTOCOLS
In order to study the security of the symmetrized PM
protocol, one needs to show that its equivalent EB pro-
tocol corresponds to the one symmetrized through the
application of random conjugate passive transformations
in phase-space. It is useful to introduce three different
distributions that can be used to describe the two sce-
narios. In order to simplify the exposition, let us first
consider the analysis of a generic CVQKD protocol in
the case of collective attacks, meaning that the proto-
col is entirely described by a single use of the quantum
channel. First, the PM protocol is naturally described
by a joint probability distribution P (x1, x2, y1, y2) where
x1, x2 (resp. y1, y2) refers to Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) mea-
surement results. The EB scenario is characterized by the
bipartite state ρ shared by Alice and Bob before their
respective measurements. In the context of a CV pro-
tocol, it is natural to describe this state by its Wigner
function W (x1, x2, y1, y2) where index 1 (resp. 2) refers
to the first (resp. second) quadrature of Alice or Bob’s
mode. Alternatively, since we restrict ourselves to pro-
tocols where both Alice and Bob perform a heterodyne
detection, we can also consider the convenient character-
ization in terms of the Q-function Q(x1, x2, y1, y2) of the
state ρ. This Q-function corresponds to the probability
distribution sampled from when measuring the state with
heterodyne detection [21] and is given by:
Q(x1, x2, y1, y2) =
1
π2
〈αA, αB|ρ|αA, αB〉, (1)
where |αA(B)〉 is a coherent state centered on αA(B) =
xA(B) + ipA(B) in Alice’s (Bob’s) phase space. Interest-
ingly, if we denoteW0 the Wigner function of the vacuum,
then Q simply corresponds to the convolution of W and
W0: Q = W ⋆W0.
The relation between the two probability distributions
P and Q can also be made explicit: if Alice measures one
mode of the two-mode squeezed vacuum with a hetero-
dyne detection and obtains outcomes x1, x2, she projects
the second mode on the coherent state |γ(x1−ix2)〉 where
the factor γ =
√
2(V − 1)/(V + 1) depends on the vari-
ance V of the two-mode squeezed vacuum [22][30]. This
means that we have the one-to-one relation:
Q(x1, x2, y1, y2) = P (γx1,−γx2, y1, y2). (2)
We now consider general n-mode states. Because of
the correspondence above, applying a random transfor-
3mation R ⊗ R with R drawn with the Haar measure on
K(n) on the classical data represented by the distribution
P is equivalent to a symmetrization in phase-space corre-
sponding to the application of random conjugate passive
linear transformations over the nmodes of Alice and Bob.
Noting G the group of passive linear transformations in
phase-space, the state obtained after the symmetrization
of n copies of the state ρ (i.e., for a collective attack) is:
S(ρ⊗n) :=
∫
U∈G
(U ⊗ U∗) ρ⊗n (U ⊗ U∗)†dU, (3)
where dU is the Haar measure over the group G.
III. SKETCH OF THE SECURITY PROOF
The rest of the paper consists in analyzing the state
S(ρ⊗n), and in particular proving that it becomes ap-
proximately Gaussian under conditions on the second
and fourth moment of P (x1, x2, y1, y2) which are usually
met in practical implementations of a CVQKD protocol.
Since the three distributions W , Q and P , equivalently
describe the protocol, we choose here to work with P ,
which is the one directly observable in the practical im-
plementation of the protocol.
Our proof will consist of two steps. First, we show that
the distribution P describing the state after the sym-
metrization tends to an explicit limiting function, where
the convergence speed is O(1/
√
n). While one could in
principle stop at this point and directly compute the se-
cret key rate that can be extracted from this state, we
will focus on the experimentally relevant scenario where
the quantum channel behaves approximately as a Gaus-
sian channel. In this case, we can bound the distance
between the limiting distribution describing the whole
protocol and a Gaussian identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) function (thus corresponding to a col-
lective Gaussian attack for which the key rate is already
known) with an error term of order O(1/
√
n). In such a
practical scenario, one can therefore bound the distance
between the actual state and the state corresponding to a
Gaussian attack by an arbitrary small quantity. Taking n
large enough, the secret key rate of the symmetrized pro-
tocol is therefore identical to the secret key rate against
collective Gaussian attacks.
IV. CONVERGENCE TO A LIMITING
DISTRIBUTION
To simplify the notations, we write P˜ the distribution
corresponding to the state S(ρ⊗n). The following lemma
from [23] (proven in Appendix A for completeness) shows
that this function only depends on 3 variables, instead of
4n for the non-symmetrized scenario.
Lemma 1. For n ≥ 2, the symmetrized distribution
P˜ (x,y) =
∫
K(n)
P (Rx, Ry)dR, (4)
where dR refers to the Haar measure on K(n), only de-
pends on ||x||2, ||y||2,x · y.
Let us note Xi = x
2
i , Yi = y
2
i , Zi = xiyi and
Xn =
∑n
i=1Xi, Y
n =
∑n
i=1 Yi, Z
n =
∑n
i=1 Zi. Because
P˜ (x,y) only depends on Xn = ||x||2, Y n = ||y||2 and
Zn = x · y, it actually corresponds to the probability
distribution Pv of the vector V
n = [Xn, Y n, Zn]:
P˜ (x,y)dxdy = Pv(V
n)dV n. (5)
According to the central limit theorem, since the vec-
tors Vi are i.i.d. (which follows from the collective attack
assumption), the distribution Pv converges to a Gaus-
sian distribution as n tends to infinity, and one can use
a multidimensional version of Berry-Esseen theorem to
bound the distance between the two distributions. Not-
ing PG the Gaussian distribution with the same first two
moments as Pv, one can prove that the variational dis-
tance ∆ between the two distributions is of the form (see
Appendix B for a more precise bound):
∆ :=
∫∫∫
R3
|Pv(V )− PG(V ))| dV = O
(
1√
n
)
. (6)
The scaling law in O(1/
√
n) is generic for Berry-Esseen
theorem and the constant factor depends on the covari-
ance matrix of [X,Y, Z], that is, on the moment of order
4 of the measurement results (x, y).
In general, one could compute the secret key rate cor-
responding to a state described by the distribution PG.
Here, we will restrict ourselves to a very concrete sce-
nario, that of a quantum channel acting like a Gaussian
channel (like an optical fiber typically [31]). We insist
that this is not a new assumption since one can always
compute the covariance matrix Σ of the distribution PG
above. However, in general, the quantum channel will be
such that Σ will be close (up to sampling errors) to the
covariance matrix obtained for a Gaussian channel.
V. THE LIMITING DISTRIBUTION PG IS
CLOSE TO AN I.I.D. GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
IN TYPICAL IMPLEMENTATIONS
In practice, the coherent states are sent through an op-
tical fiber acting as a Gaussian quantum channel, mean-
ing that the data obtained by Alice and Bob follow a
Gaussian distribution. In general, this does not simplify
the security analysis since observing variables that look
Gaussian does not mean that they indeed are Gaussian.
Here, we will show that looking Gaussian is sufficient for
the bound obtained through Berry-Esseen theorem to be
useful. Let us consider the case where
(xi, yi) ∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[ 〈x2i 〉 〈xiyi〉
〈xiyi〉 〈y2i 〉
])
. (7)
4Then, applying the symmetrization and using the re-
sults of Berry-Esseen theorem, one obtains that the sym-
metrized (normalized) distribution Pv tends to a Gaus-
sian distribution with covariance matrix ΣG:
ΣG =
[
3〈x2
i
〉2 〈x2
i
〉〈y2
i
〉+2〈xiyi〉2 3〈x2i 〉〈xiyi〉
〈x2
i
〉〈y2
i
〉+2〈xiyi〉2 3〈y2i 〉2 3〈y2i 〉〈xiyi〉
3〈x2
i
〉〈xiyi〉 3〈y2i 〉〈xiyi〉 〈x2iy2i 〉
]
. (8)
Unfortunately, however, in a practical protocol, Alice and
Bob only have access to a finite-precision estimation of
the covariance matrix, and the one they measure, Σest,
and that they use in Berry-Esseen theorem will slightly
differ from the ideal one above ΣG. The typical esti-
mation error is of the order of 1/
√
m if m samples are
used in the procedure. Assuming that the estimation
is performed with a (small) constant fraction of the total
samples n, the typical error will be on the order of 1/
√
n,
which is comparable to the error term of the Berry-Esseen
theorem. This then implies that the variational distance
between the two final distributions is also of that order
(see Appendix C for details).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF A CV QKD
PROTOCOL WITH POSTSELECTION
Using the results above, the distribution P (or equiv-
alently the Q-function) of the state describing the sym-
metrized version of the QKD protocol is 1/
√
n-close in
variational distance to a Gaussian distribution. More-
over, in a practical scenario, this Gaussian distribution
corresponds to that of an i.i.d. Gaussian state. If one
can make the error 1/
√
n small enough, then the security
of the symmetrized protocol against collective attacks is
equivalent to that of the usual (non-symmetrized) proto-
col against Gaussian attacks. In particular, the secret key
rate for the symmetrized protocol is equal to the secret
key rate against Gaussian attacks [16, 17].
Although the variational distance between the Q-
functions is a weaker criterion than the usual trace dis-
tance between the states, one can argue that this dis-
tance makes sense when considering CV QKD protocols.
Indeed, if two states have 2ǫ-close Q-functions (for the
variational distance), it means that the probability to
successfully distinguish them using heterodyne detection
is bounded by 1/2 + ǫ.
Sampling from the Haar measure on K(n) for n large
might be quite unpractical. Methods to achieve it in
complexity O(n2) are known [24, 25]. Fortunately, for
our purpose, it is sufficient to sample from the different
measure on K(n) provided that the symmetrized state
can be made arbitrary close to the state S (ρ⊗n) of Eq.
3. This can be achieved by means of quantum k-designs
as presented in Appendix D. In particular, it is reason-
able to conjecture that this can be done in complexity
O(n log n), which would be compatible with a practical
implementation.
One could wonder why the symmetrization has to be
active here in contrast to protocols such as GG02. The
difference is that the postselection, performed along the
quadrature axes, introduces some privileged directions
in phase space. Consequently one needs to actively sym-
metrize the protocol to make it invariant under rotations
in phase space.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided a first step towards a general
security proof of CVQKD protocols with postselection.
Until now, its security was only established in the very
restricted case of Gaussian attacks, which are very un-
likely to be optimal. Thanks to an active symmetrization
of the protocol (performed on the classical data of Alice
and Bob), one can show that collective attacks and actu-
ally arbitrary attacks in the asymptotic limit basically re-
duce to Gaussian attacks. The present solution is still not
very practical since one would need to randomly sample
from the unitary group in a very large dimension. Two
possible approaches should be considered: either looking
at a much smaller set of transformations for which the
sampling can be performed efficiently, or improving the
bounds derived here, possibly combining the symmetriza-
tion technique with some de Finetti-type arguments. It
seems almost clear, at any rate, that the symmetrization
technique introduced here will be required for any fur-
ther advance in the study of the security of CV QKD
with postselection.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma [1] (Lemma [1] from
[23])
Since the probability distribution P is being random-
ized under the action of the group K(n) = O(2n,R) ∩
Sp(2n,R) to give P˜ defined as
P˜ (x,y) =
∫
K(n)
P (Rx, Ry)dR (A1)
where dR refers to the Haar measure on K(n), one has:
P˜ (Rx, Ry) = P˜ (x,y) (A2)
for any x,y ∈ R2n and R ∈ K(n).
We want to show that any function P˜ : R2n×R2n, such
that P˜ (Rx, Ry) = P˜ (x,y) for any transformation R ∈
K(n) only depends on the three following parameters:
||x||2, ||y||2,x · y.
5Given any four vectors x,x′,y,y′ ∈ R2n such that
||x||2 = ||x′||2, ||y||2 = ||y′||2,x · y = x′ · y′, it is suf-
ficient to exhibit a transformation R ∈ K(n) such that
x′ = Rx and y′ = Ry to prove Lemma [1].
A transformationR ∈ K(n) can be described as a sym-
plectic map:
R = R(X,Y ) ≡
[
X Y
−Y X
]
(A3)
where the matrices X and Y are such that [26]:
XTX + Y TY = XXT + Y Y T = 1 (A4)
XTY , XY T symmetric. (A5)
Note that this matrix is written for reordered vectors of
the form [x1, x3, · · · , x2n−1, x2, x4, · · · , x2n], that is, one
first writes the n q-quadratures then the n p-quadratures
for all the vectors.
Let us introduce the following vectors a, a′,b,b′ ∈ Cn
defined as
ak = x2k−1 + ix2k , a′k = x
′
2k−1 + ix
′
2k (A6)
bk = y2k−1 + iy2k , b′k = y
′
2k−1 + iy
′
2k. (A7)
Then, the conditions read:

||a||2 = ||a′||2
||b||2 = ||b′||2
Re〈a|b〉 = Re〈a′|b′〉
, (A8)
where Re(x) refers to the real part of x.
For our purpose, it is therefore sufficient to prove that
there exists an unitary transformation U ∈ U(n) such
that Ua = a′ and Ub = b′. Indeed, one can split U into
real and imaginary parts: U = X − iY , and it is easy
to check that R = R(X,Y ) is such that Rx = x′ and
Ry = y′.
Let us introduce the following notations: A ≡ ||a||2 =
||a′||2, B ≡ ||b||2 = ||b′||2 and C ≡ Re〈a|b〉 = Re〈a′|b′〉.
Consider first the case where a and b are colinear.
This means that b = C/Aa and C = ±√AB. Using
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, |C| = |a′ · b′| ≤ ||a′|| ·
||b′|| = √AB with equality if and only if a′ and b′ are
colinear. This means that a′ and b′ are colinear and
that b′ = (C/A)a′. Because ||a|| = ||a′||, the reflexion U
across the mediator hyperplane of a and a′ is a unitary
transformation that maps a to a′. This reflexion also
maps b to b′. This ends the proof in the case where a
and b are colinear.
Let us now consider the general case where a and b
are not colinear. It is clear that a′ and b′ cannot be
colinear either. We take two bases (a,b, f3, · · · , fn) and
(a′,b′, f ′3, · · · , f ′n) of Cn and use the Gram-Schmidt pro-
cess to obtain two orthonormal bases B = (e1, · · · , en)
and B′ = (e′1, · · · , e′n). Note that vectors e1, e2, e′1 and
e′2 are given by:
e1 =
a√
A
, e2 =
b− 〈e1|b〉e1
||b− 〈e1|b〉e1|| (A9)
e′1 =
a′√
A
, e′2 =
b′ − 〈e′1|b′〉e′1
||b′ − 〈e′1|b〉e′1||
. (A10)
Let us call U the unitary operator mapping B to B′. It is
easy to see that U maps a and b to a′ and b′, respectively.
This concludes our proof.
Appendix B: Distance between the symmetrized
distribution and a Gaussian distribution:
Berry-Esseen theorem
We use a multidimensional local version of the Berry-
Esseen theorem due to Zitikis. More precisely, Theorem
1.2 of [27] reads:
Theorem 2. Let V1, · · · , Vn be a sequence of independent
and identically distributed d-variate random vectors, let
Sn =
1
n
∑n
i=1 Vi. Let µ and Σ be the first two moments of
V1, and let λmin be the least eigenvalue of Σ. Let G be a
Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covariance
matrix 1d. Let C be the class of all convex Borel sets.
Then there exists a universal constant c ≥ 0 such that
sup
C∈C
∣∣∣P (√n(Sn − µ)Σ−1/2 ∈ C)− P (G ∈ C)∣∣∣
≤ c
√
dλ
−3/2
min E
(||V1||3) /√n, (B1)
where Ln(1) = 1/n
∑
i Vi, Vi is a d-dimensional vector
and ||.|| refers to the Euclidean norm.
First, we note that the quantity
sup
C∈C
|P (x ∈ C)− P (y ∈ C)| (B2)
corresponds to the variational distance between the dis-
tributions of x and y.
In the case of CVQKD, we need to consider tridimen-
sional random vectors Vi = [Xi, Yi, Zi] and one can im-
mediately estimate µ and Σ from the experimental data.
Using the notations of the main text and applying The-
orem 2 gives∫∫∫
R3
|Pv(V )− PG(V ))| dV
≤ c
√
3λ
−3/2
min E
(
||X21 + Y 21 + Z21 ||3/2
)
/
√
n, (B3)
where PG corresponds to the multivariate Gaussian dis-
tribution with the same first two moments as Pv.
Appendix C: Error due to the finite estimation
sample
Let us assume that the variables (xk, yk) follow a cen-
tered bivariate normal distribution, as typical in experi-
mental implementations of CVQKD.
During the parameter estimation, Alice and Bob need
to estimate the fourth moments of (xk, yk) given by the
covariance matrix Σ:
Σ =
[
〈x4
i
〉 〈x2
i
y2
i
〉 〈x3
i
yi〉
〈x2
i
y2
i
〉 〈y4
i
〉 〈xiy3i 〉
〈x3
i
yi〉 〈xiy3i 〉 〈x2iy2i 〉
]
6Alternatively, one can describe this matrix by the vector
Vi = [〈x4i 〉, 〈x3i yi〉, 〈x2i y2i 〉, 〈xiy3i 〉, 〈y4i 〉]. In order to esti-
mate this vector, one uses the estimator V¯m defined as
V¯ m :=
1√
m
∑
i1,··· ,im
Vi, (C1)
where i1, · · · , im are m randomly chosen indices among
{1, · · · , n}. Using the mutlivariate version of the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem, one obtains that the estimator V¯ m
converges to the true value and that the error follows a
normal distribution.
More precisely, let us note ΣG the true covariance ma-
trix and Σest the estimated matrix, i.e.,
ΣG =
[
3〈x2
i
〉2 〈x2
i
〉〈y2
i
〉+2〈xiyi〉2 3〈x2i 〉〈xiyi〉
〈x2
i
〉〈y2
i
〉+2〈xiyi〉2 3〈y2i 〉2 3〈y2i 〉〈xiyi〉
3〈x2
i
〉〈xiyi〉 3〈y2i 〉〈xiyi〉 〈x2iy2i 〉
]
,
(C2)
and
Σest =
1
m
∑
i1,··· ,im
[
x4
i
x2
i
y2
i
x3
i
yi
x2
i
y2
i
y4
i
xiy
3
i
x3
i
yi xiy
3
i
x2
i
y2
i
]
. (C3)
Then, the Central Limit Theorem asserts that the ran-
dom matrix
√
m(Σest−ΣG) converges in distribution to a
centered multivariate normal distribution with a covari-
ance matrix depending on moments of order 8 of (xk, yk).
We do not explicitate this matrix here as it is rather cum-
bersome, but it is straightforward to compute it.
The result of this analysis is that the error in esti-
mating the correct covariance matrix Σg scales as 1/
√
m
where m is the number of samples used. In order to
obtain an error of the same order of magnitude as the
one due to Berry-Esseen theorem, one should use a con-
stant fraction of the data for the parameter estimation.
In that case, the covariance matrix would be estimated
with a precision 1/
√
n.
We now prove that this error for the covariance ma-
trices translates into an error (computed with respect to
the variational distance) of the same magnitude for the
probability distributions.
Let us first consider the case of univariate normal dis-
tributions, that is two normal distributions N (0, σ21) and
N (0, σ22) with σ2 > σ1. Let us note g1 and g2 their re-
spective density function. One has:∫ ∞
−∞
|g1(x) − g2(x)|dx
= 2erf
(
σ2
√
ln(σ2/σ1)
σ22 − σ21
)
− 2erf
(
σ1
√
ln(σ2/σ1)
σ22 − σ21
)
where erf(x) = 2/
√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function. In
particular, if one has σ2 = σ1+δ where δ = O(1/
√
n) is a
small error, then a first order expansion of the expression
above gives∫ ∞
−∞
|g1(x)− g2(x)|dx = δ
√
8
eπσ21
+ o
(
1√
n
)
. (C4)
One can extend this analysis to the case of multivari-
ate normal distributions with covariance matrices differ-
ing by an error of the order of 1/
√
n, and one would
get that the variational distance between the two distri-
butions is also of the order of 1/
√
n. For lisibility, we
omit the precise bound here but it can be computed in a
straightforward manner.
Appendix D: Approximate symmetrization using
efficient construction of quantum k-designs
Sampling from the group K(n) is equivalent to sam-
pling from the unitary group U(n). Indeed, any map in
K(n) can be described by its action on the annihilation
operators on the n modes. Let us note ai (resp. bi)
the annihilation operator on the ith mode of Alice (resp.
Bob). A map U ∈ K(n) is described by the unitary ui,j
that transforms ai into
∑n
j=1 ui,jaj . Let us consider a
general state ρ ∈ (HA ⊗HB)⊗n,
ρ =
∑
ia,ib,ja,jb
λiaibjajb |ia, ib〉〈ja, jb|, (D1)
where ia = (ia1 , i
a
2 , · · · , ian) describes the photon distribu-
tion in Alice’s n modes (and similarly for Bob with ib).
The state |ia, ib〉 = 1√
ia!ib!
∏
k=1n
(
a†k
)ia
k
(
b†k
)ib
k |00〉 is
transformed under the action of U ⊗ U∗ into
U ⊗ U∗|ia, ib〉 =
1√
ia!ib!
∏
k=1n
(
n∑
l=1
uk,la
†
l
)ia
k
(
n∑
l=1
u∗k,lb
†
l
)ib
k
|00〉. (D2)
Let us fix a maximal photon number N together with
the projector ΠN on the subspace of HA ⊗HB spanned
by Fock states |ia, ib〉 with a total photon number less or
equal to N . For some given first four moments of ρ, there
exists a constant cǫ such that taking N = cǫn leads to∥∥∥ρ−ΠNρΠ†N∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ. (D3)
Noting ρN = ΠNρΠ
†
N , one observes that (U⊗U∗)ρN (U⊗
U∗)† is a polynomial of degree N in ui,j. Consider an
approximate N -design ν, then for any k ≤ N , one has
∥∥∥∥
∫
Haar
(U ⊗ U∗) ρ⊗n (U ⊗ U∗)†dU
−
∑
ν
(U(ν)⊗ U∗(ν)) ρ⊗n (U(ν)⊗ U∗(ν))†
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫdesign.
(D4)
Hence, it is sufficient to use an approximate N -design in-
stead of the Haar measure on the unitary group U(n) in
order to symmetrize the state ρN , up to some arbitrary
7small error ǫdesign. Interestingly, efficient constructions
of such approximate N -designs are known [28]. In these
constructions, the number of unitaries in the design scales
as nO(N) which means that one needs O(n logn) bits of
randomness to draw one such unitary (since N is pro-
portional to the number of modes). Unfortunately, the
construction provided in [28] only works in the regime
where N = O(n/ logn), which is close to, but not ex-
actly the regime of interest here. Nevertheless, the exis-
tence of this construction gives hope that one could con-
struct an approximate N -design also in the regime where
N = O(n). If this were true, then one could efficiently
(in time O(n logn)) perform the symmetrization studied
in the main text.
[1] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. Cerf,
M. Dušek, N. Lütkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 1301 (2009).
[2] K. Inoue, E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. Lett.
89, 037902 (2002).
[3] D. Stucki, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, V. Scarani, and
H. Zbinden, Appl. Phys. Lett. 87, 194108 (pages 3)
(2005).
[4] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, R. Garcia-Patron, N. Cerf,
T. Ralph, J. Shapiro, and S. Lloyd, Arxiv preprint
arXiv:1110.3234 (2011).
[5] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88,
057902 (2002).
[6] C. Weedbrook, A. M. Lance, W. P. Bowen, T. Symul,
T. C. Ralph, and P. K. Lam, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504
(2004).
[7] R. García-Patrón and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97,
190503 (2006).
[8] M. Navascués, F. Grosshans, and A. Acín, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 97, 190502 (2006).
[9] S. Pirandola, S. L. Braunstein, and S. Lloyd, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 101, 200504 (2008).
[10] R. Renner and J. I. Cirac, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 110504
(2009).
[11] A. Leverrier, F. Grosshans, and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev.
A 81, 062343 (2010).
[12] C. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lütkenhaus, and
G. Leuchs, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[13] S. Lorenz, N. Korolkova, and G. Leuchs, Appl. Phys. B
79, 273 (2004).
[14] A. M. Lance, T. Symul, V. Sharma, C. Weedbrook, T. C.
Ralph, and P. K. Lam, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 180503
(2005).
[15] S. Lorenz, J. Rigas, M. Heid, U. L. Andersen, N. Lütken-
haus, and G. Leuchs, Phys. Rev. A 74, 042326 (2006).
[16] M. Heid and N. Lütkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 76, 022313
(2007).
[17] T. Symul, D. J. Alton, S. M. Assad, A. M. Lance,
C. Weedbrook, T. C. Ralph, and P. K. Lam, Phys. Rev.
A 76, 030303 (2007).
[18] M. M. Wolf, G. Giedke, and J. I. Cirac, Phys. Rev. Lett.
96, 080502 (2006).
[19] N. Walk, T. Symul, T. Ralph, and P. Lam, Arxiv preprint
1106.0825 (2011).
[20] A. Leverrier, E. Karpov, P. Grangier, and N. J. Cerf,
New J. Phys. 11, 115009 (2009).
[21] U. Leonhardt, Measuring the quantum state of light,
vol. 22 (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1997).
[22] F. Grosshans, N. Cerf, J. Wenger, R. Tualle-Brouri, and
P. Grangier, Quantum Information and Computation 3,
535 (2003).
[23] A. Leverrier and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. A 81, 062314
(2010).
[24] A. Leverrier and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. A 83, 042312
(2011).
[25] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, and A. Leverrier, Phys.
Rev. A 84, 062317 (2011).
[26] Arvind, B. Dutta, N. Mukunda, and R. Simon, Pramana
45, 471 (1995).
[27] R. Zitikis, in Stability problems for stochastic models
(Suzdal, 1991) (Springer, Berlin, 1993), vol. 1546 of Lec-
ture Notes in Math., pp. 197–211.
[28] A. Harrow and R. Low, Approximation, Randomization,
and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Tech-
niques pp. 548–561 (2009).
[29] B. Heim, D. Elser, T. Bartley, M. Sabuncu, C. Wittmann,
D. Sych, C. Marquardt, and G. Leuchs, Applied Physics
B: Lasers and Optics 98, 635 (2010).
[30] In the PM scenario, Alice’s modulation has a variance
V − 1.
[31] Other experimental setups can be considered in prac-
tice, for instance free-space CVQKD [29]. In that case, it
would be interesting to see whether the quantum channel
behaves approximately like a Gaussian channel.
